Sri Lanka: Proposed Counterterrorism Law Risks More Abuses.

Photo by  Supun D Hewage on pexels.com 

History is repeating itself in Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism framework. Once again, the State is treated as the primary victim, while civilian protection is secondary. 

Introduced in December 2025, the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA) was presented as a replacement for the notorious Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). In practice, however, it preserves the same repressive logic that has long enabled abuse and suppressed dissent.

The PTA, enacted in 1979 as a temporary measure, became a permanent tool of repression, facilitating arbitrary detention, torture, and intimidation, particularly against Tamils, Muslims, journalists, activists, and political opponents. Although Sri Lanka pledged in 2017 to repeal the PTA, partly to satisfy the European Union and benefit from GSP+ trade arrangements, and reaffirmed that commitment during the 2024 election campaign, the introduction of the PSTA shows those promises were not fulfilled.

Concern is growing because the PSTA retains  the PTA’s core features. First of all, its excessively broad definition of terrorism includes acts such as intimidating the public or compelling the government to act, risking the criminalisation of protests, trade union activity, journalism, and political dissent. The law also restricts freedom of expression by penalising publications that may indirectly encourage terrorism, grants sweeping powers of arrest, search, and seizure to police and armed forces, allows detention without charge for up to two years with minimal judicial oversight, and expands executive authority through proscription orders, curfews, and the designation of “prohibited places.” Moreover, provisions allowing prosecution to be deferred in exchange for confessions and compulsory “rehabilitation” raise serious issues of coercion, punishment without trial, and potential torture, while harsh penalties, extensive surveillance powers, mandatory reporting requirements, and extraterritorial application further threaten due process, digital freedoms, and civic space.

These risks are not merely theoretical. UN human rights experts have repeatedly found that Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism laws breach international standards, including the ICCPR, the Convention on Enforced Disappearance, and the Convention against Torture, and these shortcomings are reflected in ongoing abuses under the current government. In 2025, two young Muslim men were detained for months under the PTA for criticizing Israel and later released without charge, while government data shows PTA arrests rising from 38 in all of 2024 to 49 in the first five months of 2025. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has also documented repeated questioning of human rights defenders, and in August 2025 police investigated a journalist for reporting on a wartime mass grave. In the north and east, baseless “terrorism” investigations appear aimed at intimidating civil society and obstructing legitimate work.

International response has been sharply critical. As early as 2021, UN experts outlined minimum standards for lawful counterterrorism legislation, including narrow definitions, judicial oversight, and safeguards against abuse, standards the PSTA fails to meet. More recently, Human Rights Watch has warned that the law risks facilitating the same violations as the PTA, while the EU has stressed that meaningful reform is essential to maintain GSP+ trade concessions, placing Sri Lanka’s economic and diplomatic standing at risk.

The consequences are predictable and dangerous. By framing terrorism primarily as a threat to the state rather than violence against civilians, the PSTA normalises repression, deepens mistrust in institutions, and criminalises dissent. Experience in Sri Lanka and elsewhere shows that such laws undermine security, entrench authoritarianism, and erode legitimacy.

What is needed is not another rebranded security law, but a decisive break from the past. A rights-respecting counterterrorism framework must be narrowly defined, centred on preventing violence against civilians, and grounded in judicial oversight, due process, and accountability. Above all, it must be people-centred, not state-centred.

written by Clara Pescatori